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Abstract
This article provides a critical understanding of dynamics behind the 
roles of the People’s Liberation Front (JVP) in post-1977 Sri Lankan 
politics. Having suffered a severe setback in the early 1970s, the 
JVP transformed itself into a significant force in electoral politics that 
eventually brought the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) to 
power. This article explains the transformation by examining the 
radical political setting and mapping out the actors and various 
movements which allowed the JVP to emerge as a dominant player 
within the hegemonic political mainstream in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, 
it also highlights the structural changes in JVP politics and its 
challenges for future consolidation.  
Introduction
The 1977 general election marked a major turning point in 
the history of post-colonial Sri Lanka. While the landslide victory of 
the United National Party (UNP) was the most important highlight 
of the election results, the shocking defeat for the old leftist parties 
was equally important. Both the victory of the UNP and the defeat of 
the left were symbolic. The left’s electoral defeat was soon followed 
by the introduction of new macro-economic policy framework 
under the UNP’s rule, which replaced protective economic policy 
framework that was endorsed by the Left.1 Ironically enough, as 
if to dig its own grave, the same UNP government helped People’s 
Liberation Front (JVP), which became a formidable threat to the 
smooth implementation of the new economic policies, to re-enter 
into the political mainstream by way of freeing its leadership from 
the prison. The JVP leadership had been put behind bars by the 
previous regime following the failed armed insurgency in 1971.
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Recovered from the setback of 1971, the JVP became an 
important player in the political history of the post-1977 period, 
and organised a bloody armed insurgency that lasted from 1987-
1989 and virtually brought the entire Sinhala-Buddhist south 
into a civil war. Although the insurgency was brutally suppressed 
and the entire JVP leadership – not to mention thousands of its 
activists – was eliminated, political stability of the UNP regime had 
been seriously damaged as a result of the confrontation. The JVP, 
however, again recovered, transforming itself under an entirely a 
new leadership to become a formidable force in electoral politics. 
Ultimately, it was decisive in bringing into power the United People’s 
Freedom Alliance (UPFA), led by Mahinda Rajapaksha, now the 
current president.  
This essay attempts to explain the central and extremely 
dynamic role played by the JVP in post-1977 politics. It locates 
the JVP in the larger context of a radical political and ideological 
setting. It specifically aims to locate the state of the JVP following 
its transformation into a component of the hegemonic political 
mainstream in the early 2000s and consequent internal split of 
2008. By doing so, the essay intends to shed light on post-2008 
developments within the JVP.
The essay consists of three parts. Part I maps the radical post-
1977 political setting. It not only describes the major players of 
radical politics such as the old left and the JVP, but also attempts 
to incorporate unconventional elements into the analysis, such as 
the Jathika Chintanaya movement and, what I call, the avant-garde 
left movement. Part II unravels the dynamics of a post-1977 JVP. 
It aims to explain how the JVP recovered from the major setback it 
faced following the failed insurgencies of 1971 and 1987-89, and 
how it emerged as a dominant player within the hegemonic political 
mainstream in the early 2000s. Part III attempts to analyse structural 
changes in JVP politics in the context of its mainstreaming. It also 
highlights the challenges it faces in the post-2008 recovery process 
being undertaken up to now.
Part I.  Decline of the old left and the rise of JVP in the post-
1977 Sinhala-Buddhist south
Release of the JVP leadership from prison was a direct 
result of the general election victory of the UNP in 1977. In 1971, 
insurgents were charged at a special tribunal – the Criminal Justice 
Commission – set up by a special parliamentary act. With the repeal 
of the Criminal Justice Commission Act by the UNP government, 
the convicts were automatically freed (Alles, 2001: 253). 
Although the old left lost all of the parliamentary seats, it 
remained on the political scene – although, its influence was 
fast diminishing. There were two main factors that helped it 
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remain on the scene. The first was its involvement in the trade 
union sector. Although trade union militancy had severely been 
debilitated following the 1980 general strike2, collective bargaining 
still had an important role to play in industrial relations. All leftist 
parties had a significant union base and this gave them a form of 
mobilisation capability among the labourers. At least some union 
members could be mobilised for the important political rituals of 
left parties, such as annual May Day celebrations and occasional 
street demonstrations. 
Secondly, there remained some leading figures of the left 
who retained some – although waning – mass support within 
their constituencies. This support was the vestige of massive 
support which the old left had yielded in the early phase of its 
history. This limited mass support could be utilised in order to gain 
representation in parliament, provincial councils, and other local 
bodies. This was achieved through the elections that were held under 
the combined proportional representation and preferential voting 
systems, especially when these parties fought elections allied with 
the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). This was the case following 
the 1994 general election. In Colombo, Ratnapura, Kegalle, Galle, 
and Matara, left party members could win seats. Moreover, they 
also gained several slots in the National List in which 29 out of 225 
were chosen. However, one of the problems that the left parties 
faced with these electoral gains in alliance with the SLPF was the 
absconding of their popular leaders to the SLFP.
Breakaway groups from the old left
A number of breakaway groups from the old left tried to 
put into practice their revolutionary ideals. Splits occurred when 
dissenting elements inside these parties, favouring revolutionary 
ideals, challenged pragmatic steps being taken by the dominant 
party leadership in order to prevent the further decline of mass 
support.
Two important events in the early 1960s initiated a wave 
of internal splits in the old left parties. The first was the split in 
the Communist Party following the Soviet-China rivalry in the 
international communist movement. The other was the decision 
of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) to enter into a coalition 
with the SLFP in 1964. There were a large number of groups that 
emerged out of this crisis in the left. The most influential of this 
constellation of groups was, indeed, the JVP. Many others dwindled 
and vanished, while some managed to play a role in the post-1977 
political scene. Some of these groups effectively functioned as 
the articulators of radical ideals of the left. These groups failed, 
however, to attract wider mass support and further divided into 
smaller groups through an amoebic process.
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The history of these groups is yet to be written, especially in 
order to evaluate their place in the radical political space in post-
colonial politics. Many groups disappeared and some reintegrated 
into the political mainstream in various ways. Several groups, 
however, stood out through the making of important ideological 
intervention. These exceptional groups were the Revolutionary 
Communist League (lately re-named the Socialist Equality Party), 
Marxist Workers’ League led by prolific radical left writer T. Andrade, 
and the Wikalpa group which was led by fellow prolific writer Dayan 
Jayathilaka.
 The major activity of these groups remained in the intellectual 
domain. They engaged in propaganda and educational work among 
radical political elements. These groups were always identified 
with their periodicals. The Revolutionary Communist League 
published the Kamkaru Mawatha (Worker’s Path). The name of the 
Wikalpa group originated from the quarterly Wikalpa (Alternative) 
journal, which was published under the editorship of a group of 
left-wing activists, some of whom did not identify themselves with 
the Wikalpa Kandayama. It’s ‘official’ name, Wiplavakari Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (Revolutionary People’s Liberation Front), was 
however virtually unknown to outsiders.
The place of the Nava Sama Samaja Party (NSSP), another 
breakaway fraction from the LSSP, has to be explained somewhat 
separately. On one hand, it had quite a significant union base. 
Radical elements of the trade unions under the party’s control were 
attracted to the party. On the other hand, it had some popular 
characters – Vasudeva Nanayakkara being one of them – who 
wielded certain charismatic authority over rural masses. These 
two factors helped it to mobilise mass support and remain in the 
electoral process, although at a dwindling pace
The rise of the JVP in the post-1977 
Although the JVP had its origin as an organisation in the old 
left (from the Chinese wing of the Sri Lanka Communist Party), it 
marked the beginning of a new trend in the left’s radicalism. First 
and foremost, the JVP mobilised a different constituency from that 
of the old left – the rural and lower-to-middle-class youth. In this 
sense, Mick Moore’s observation that the JVP at its initial stage 
established itself in the traditional ‘red base’ was not quite accurate 
(Moore, 1993: 629). In relation to the social base of the JVP, it is 
possible to suggest that the JVP originated out of the fundamental 
crisis of the peasant agriculture in the Sinhala-Buddhist south.3 At 
the centre of this crisis was the issue of surplus labour that could 
not be absorbed into the existing peasant production. A significant 
proportion of the possessors of this surplus labour obtained 
education through an expanding free-education system. The urban 
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economy, too, however, was not expanding enough in order to 
absorb this surplus labour, especially among those educated rural 
youth. 
This educated rural youth suffered heavily from this severe 
crisis because their high expectations to climb the economic and 
social ladder became restricted. Therefore, the JVP’s political 
appeal was quite attractive to this group.4 Looking at the quick 
mobilisation of a large number of activists within a short span of 
four to five years, one can appreciate the radical social character 
of this generation. The JVP mobilised these young people for an 
island-wide insurgency which was totally unprecedented, shocking 
the entire social fabric. This task was achieved with minimum 
resources and simple knowledge. 
It is useful to recall how the JVP leader Rohana Wijeweera 
came across this generation of rural youth in the mid 1960s when 
he was entrusted with the task of leading the youth (and Chinese) 
wing of the Communist Party, which was led by N. Shanmugadasan 
at the time. He  later recalled that he travelled around the country in 
order to strengthen the organisations (Alles, 2001: 9). It is sufficient 
to bear in mind how quickly Wijeweera was able to build up a large 
group of activists. In talking to any member of the 1971 JVP, it 
became clear how easy it was for them to recruit new members. The 
famous method of recruitment was koku gehilla (hooking). Once 
an individual was persuaded to join the movement, he/she was 
given a series of lectures known as panthi paha (five classes) at a 
clandestine place. The content of these classes focused on simplified 
popular Marxist critique of the existing economic political and social 
setting, and a romantic version of the notion of socialist revolution.
It is now appropriate to ask how the JVP recovered from the 
1971 crackdown soon after its leadership was released from jail 
in 1977. The answer may be quite simple. The mindset of the JVP 
constituency remained unchanged even after the suppression of 
1971, and despite the attempts made by the regime to win over the 
support base of the JVP. In particular, measures taken to revitalise 
the rural economy had not been effective enough, at least at the 
short term. Even the economic liberalisation process of the post-
1977 period, which mainly focused on addressing the issues of 
rural poverty and youth unemployment, did not produce effective 
results. This explains why the JVP was able to organise a more 
effective insurgency in the late 1980s, for which a great part of 
support was drawn from the rural youth in the Sinhala-Buddhist 
south5. 
The situation became extremely worse because of the 
widening mismatch between expectations and opportunities. Severe 
resistance from university undergraduates for the marketisation 
of university education explains this mismatch. There was stiff 
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resistance against private sector involvement in tertiary institutes 
from those who threw their lot in with the state-sponsored higher 
education system. The radicalisation of medical students who 
agitated against a newly established private medical college in the 
late 1980s was a major rallying point for JVP-sponsored student 
activities. Given that medical undergraduates are usually a 
conservative section of the student population, their radicalization, 
therefore, can be used as a major index of the level of radicalisation 
among the educated sections of youth.
Recruitment capability of the JVP in the post-1977 period
The recruiting ability of new members is an important aspect 
of radical political movements. Unlike traditional left parties, the 
JVP had a remarkable ability to continuously attract new members. 
The ability of the old left in attracting new members came to an end 
in the mid 1960s. 
The appropriate question that may be asked is: Why does 
an individual join a radical political group? This could also be 
discussed broadly under the theme of ‘the problem of party 
allegiance’. I identify three structures of party allegiance in the 
Sinhala-Buddhist south: (1) traditional allegiance; (2) pragmatic 
allegiance; (3) anti-hegemonic allegiance. There can, at the same 
time, be movement from one structure of allegiance to another. 
I argue that these movements are relative to different political 
groupings. For this discussion, identifying the distinction between 
two modes of political groupings in the political system may be 
useful – the difference between hegemonising groups and anti-
hegemonic groups. Hegemonising groups are those which perform 
the task of organising collective wills of the people into the existing 
hegemony. On the contrary, anti-hegemonic groups organise anti-
hegemonic collective wills. I propose here a two-stage scheme to 
understand the transformation of the political allegiance.
Stage one: As mentioned above, hegemonising and anti-
hegemonic groups, alike, perform the same task – that is, the 
organising of collective wills. This stage comes to an end when the 
consent of the masses is firmly established for the existing political 
system. In the case of anti-hegemonic groups, the end of this stage 
may be marked by the victory or defeat of their decisive battles 
against the existing regimes.
Stage two: In this stage, the party allegiance is mainly 
determined by the ability of party leaderships to provide access 
for party members to resource redistribution networks in the 
socio-economic setting. Compared to stage one, the second stage 
represents a normalisation of the behaviour of political groups in 
the hegemonic redistributive network.6 Once the normalisation is 
accomplished in relation to a political grouping, either individual 
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interests of existing members towards the resource redistribution 
network may replace collective wills of the constituency as the raison 
d’être of the party allegiance, or new members with such interests 
may join the party. This situation is known as clientelism. At this 
stage, the recruitment ability of the political group is dependent 
on its ability to be a part of the resource redistribution network. In 
other words, the group has to enjoy some degree of state power as 
the state is a most capable agency for redistribution of resources. 
Anti-hegemonic groups are less capable of enjoying this ability 
because they remain outside state power – unless they capture 
state power at the first stage as in the case of the Bolsheviks in 
Russia and communists in China.
In the case of the old left, stage one ended in the mid 1950s 
when the political forces that were challenged by the anti-hegemonic 
left regained their lost ground in the late 1950s. I identify the 1953 
popular uprising, known as 53 Hartal, as the event that marked the 
end of the anti-hegemonic phase. With election victory of 1956, the 
SLFP emerged as a hegemonic party which successfully attracted 
the rural masses for whom the left parties had become a formidable 
force. The re-organisation and transformation of UNP from an elite-
centred party to a mass-based one reassured its appeal to both the 
rural lower classes, and urban working class. The coalition strategy 
that the left adopted in order to regain its loss of ground among 
the masses failed in the long run. Thus, at the end of 1970s it had 
virtually lost the ability to attract new members. Then, how did 
the JVP continue to attract new members? This was because, until 
the consolidation of the Mahinda Rajapaksha regime after 2005, 
the hegemonic forces had failed the rural educated youth – the 
main constituency of the JVP. Therefore, the JVP was easily able to 
recruit from this constituency. This ability was, however, severely 
reduced following the consolidation of the Mahinda Rajapaksha 
regime. 
From 1994-2004, the JVP became a formidable electoral force 
among the new middle class in the semi-urban fringe of Colombo. 
This new middle class was created as a result of the expansion of 
the urban economy, especially after 1990. Members of this class 
were those who migrated to these areas from the rural sector. 
Besides the JVP, Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) emerged as a strong 
contender to win the support of this constituency. As far as the 
JVP is concerned, the recruitment ability of the members of this 
class for a radical cause was extremely low as this class was firmly 
integrated into the existing economic and social setting. The de-
radicalisation of JVP politics from 1994-2005 was largely due to the 
growing influence of the political interests of this new middle class 
on the JVP political strategy.7  
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Breakaway groups from the JVP
The JVP has been likened to a large hall with two doors, 
in which new members continuously enter from one door and a 
constant flow occurs out of the other while, at the same time, the 
hall remains full (Chandraprema, C.A., The Island, February, 21, 
1990). The JVP is generally viewed as a youth political movement 
dominated by a membership belonging to a particular age cohort. 
When a youthful member of the JVP passes this age of radical 
politics, the tendency is to leave radical political activity and settle 
down in the hegemonic setting. The timing may depend on many 
factors, especially the ways in which the member is integrated into 
the economic system and family life.
This outflow of JVP members from the party can be seen as a 
result of the de-radicalisation of political subjectivity. In addition to 
this main outflow of members, there is another outflow – although in 
lesser quantity – through radicalisation of the political subjectivity 
of the party member. This outflow takes place when tension occurs 
between the revolutionary ideals of the party’s political ideology 
and the actual political behaviour of the party at a given moment. 
The general pattern is for the ‘radical elements’, who see the latter 
as a betrayal of the former, leave the party and form competing 
groups. There were several moments in the JVP’s history when 
radical groups left the party and attempted to form new groups – 
for example in 1971-77, early 1980s, and early 1990s. These were 
moments in which the JVP was reconsidering its political strategy 
following decisive political events.
The history of these breakaway groups, however, shows 
that they have failed in the long run to retain those activists who 
left the JVP. Many members who leave the party in this manner 
also gradually leave radical political activism, although some may 
remain loyal to radical political ideas for a longer period. Some JVP 
spokesmen humorously use the term wishramika kerelikaruwo 
(retired rebels) to designate the members of these splinter groups. 
Therefore, it is ironical that this process of moving away of JVP 
members maintaining an ultra-leftist radical stance  provided a 
safe passage for them to leave anti-hegemonic politics and integrate 
into the hegemonic socio-economic setting.
Apart from the JVP, the mid 1980s witnessed the emergence 
of two new radical discourses which had a decisive impact on the 
JVP in the following years. What follows is a discussion on these 
two important discourses. 
Two new discursive spaces in radical politics: Jathika Chintanaya 
and the avant-garde left
These two radical discourses can be identified as responses 
to the political and ideological crisis of the dominant imagination 
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of the left. They evolved out of discursive elements that had longer 
histories. Jathika Chintanaya was ideologically linked to the 
Sinhala nationalist discourse that had its origin in the latter part of 
the nineteenth century (Dewasiri, 2000). The avant-garde left had 
its discursive roots in the new art movement which started in the 
early 1960s. These two movements became extremely influential in 
the late 1980s-1990s, and produced a fundamental challenge to 
the existing paradigm of radical left politics.
Jathika Chintanaya. This movement emerged in the post-
1977 period, owing fundamentally to the works of two intellectuals. 
It presented an alternative political imagination to that of the left 
against capitalism. Gunadasa Amarasekera was a famous writer 
and a cultural and political critic. For a long time, he had close 
links with the left. He had a critical attitude towards orthodox 
Marxism and less sympathy towards the nationalist sentiments 
of the Sinhala masses. Amarasekera repeated the allegation of 
Martin Wickramasinghe, another famous writer and a cultural 
critic, concerning the failure of the left to indigenise Marxism. He 
systematically presented his views in publishing the Abuddassa 
Yugayak in 1976 (Amarasekera, 1976). Nalin de Silva was an 
influential member of the left and was, indeed, at its far radical 
extreme. In the mid 1970s he was a leading intellectual figure of 
the Nava Sama Samaja Party (NSSP) – a breakaway group from the 
LSSP.
I argue that these two intellectuals deviated from the left 
because of the traumatic impact of two important events. The 
breakup of the coalition between the SLFP and the LSSP in 1975, 
bringing the United Front government into crisis, was the event 
that had a decisive impact on Amarasekera. This impact can be 
understood from his novel Gamanaka Meda (Amarasekera, 2006). 
The ‘event’ for Nalin de Silva was the defeat of the 1980 general 
strike. NSSP had high expectations for the 1980 July general strike 
to be the catalyst for revolution. The defeat of the general strike was 
a heavy blow to the political strategy of the NSSP and, especially, to 
its optimism for an imminent revolution.8
Soon after this, Nalin de Silva departed the NSSP and began to 
question the capability of Marxism to challenge capitalism, especially 
the limitation of the political vision based on the revolutionary 
agency of the working class. There was no nationalist orientation in 
Nalin de Silva at the beginning of his questioning of Marxism and 
the agency of the working class. In the mid 1980s, however, both he 
and Amarasekera had arrived at the conclusion that jathiya (nation) 
could be a better alternative to the (working) class, and ‘ethos of the 
nation’ would provide an alternative political consciousness and 
basis to build a political vision to challenge capitalist consumerism. 
The Sinhala nationalist turn in the political lines of these two was 
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largely determined by the rise of the Tamil militant nationalism in 
the 1980s. There was an upsurge of nationalist sentiment among 
Sinhala Buddhists in response to the rise of Sinhala nationalism. 
Nalin de Silva not only challenged the political vision of the 
radical left by questioning the revolutionary agency of the working 
class upon which its political vision was built, but he also questioned 
the epistemological basis of Marxism. His epistemological critique 
was systematically presented in the work aptly titled Mage Lokaya 
(My World). In this work, he criticised the Cartesian approach to 
knowledge and questioned the possibility of objective truth, which, 
he argued, was the cornerstone of Marxist thinking, too. 
It should be mentioned that most of the issues that Nalin 
de Silva raised had drawn the attention of the critical tradition of 
western Marxism. For example, there was great similarity between 
the questions that Nalin de Silva raised and the issues raised 
by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in their work Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). I argue, however, 
that Nalin de Silva had not unraveled these issues with sufficient 
conceptual rigour as Laclau and Mouffe did.
This intervention was readily welcomed by a significant section 
of the radical youth, especially intelligent sections of university 
undergraduates. The University of Colombo and University of 
Moratuwa had sizable followings for Nalin de Silva. Many of these 
young student activists who were attracted to Nalin de Silva’s 
intellectual interventions became central figures on the intellectual 
scene in the coming period. Two years later, Amarasekera also 
produced another influential piece of work, especially aimed at 
Sinhala rural educated youth. The work carried the evocative title 
Ganaduru Mediyama Dakinemi Arunalu (I see the rays of the dawn 
in the darkness of the midnight). This work urged JVP youth to 
combine Marxism with Sinhala nationalism. This was  quite fitting 
with the political strategy of the JVP at this juncture. The JVP 
therefore tactically tolerated this intervention even though it was not 
in agreement with Amarasekera’s work. This toleration, however, 
helped young radical elements, who were on the margins of the 
JVP’s political activities, to orient toward the Jathika Chintanaya.
The anti-capitalist stance of Jathika Chintanaya gradually 
became less important as its exponents opted to become the most 
eloquent advocates of Sinhala nationalist interest vis-a-vis the 
growing political and ideological power of Tamil ethnonationalism. 
This Tamil nationalism emerged as the political and ideological 
‘other’ of Jathika Chintanaya, in place of capitalist consumerism.
A close alliance was established in the early 2000s between 
the JVP and the Jathika Chintanaya movement, making this a 
highly influential political alliance. One of the important results of 
this alliance was the transformation of the political subjectivity of 
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the typical JVP member from a radical cosmopolitanist to a popular 
nationalist. This transformation became quite significant in the 
context of the internal split which occurred in 2008. In this split, 
Wimal Weerawansa, the powerful propaganda secretary and most 
popular public orator of the JVP, deserted the party with a large 
group to join the Rajapaksha regime. 
Avant-garde left. Roots of this movement are found in the 
cultural scene of the beginning of 1960s, when a new group of 
Colombo-based artists and art critics were emerging under the 
heavy influence of the post-World War II avant-garde intellectual 
milieu of the west.
An early sign of this movement was seen in the following works: 
Siri Gunasinghe’s novel Hevenella (Shadow) (1960); Amarasekera’s 
novel Yali Upannemi (Born Again) (1962); Ajith Thilakasena’s short 
stories; Sugathapala de Silva’s dramas. The arts-drama field, in 
particular, created a vibrant intellectual space for young radical 
artists and critics. Drama production was, by nature, a collective 
endeavour. This field provided young artists and critics with an 
alternative space to engage in lively exchange of ideas.
This movement gained momentum in the 1970s, especially 
following the 1971 youth insurgency. Although this movement did 
not make any impact on the politics of radical youth in the late 
1960s, the opposite was the case. Quite significantly, there was 
a conspicuous gap between the dominant political imagination of 
the left and that of these avant-garde artists, irrespective of the 
fact that almost all these intellectuals had close connections with 
the traditional left parties. The Revolutionary Communist League 
(RCL), a radical Trotskyite group, identified the political potential 
of this avant-garde trend and, indeed, some of its numbers had 
become political supporters of the RCL in the 1970s and early 
1980s. This group made a conscious attempt to win these artists 
and critics over to radical Marxist politics. Sucharitha Gamlath and 
Piyaseeli Wijegunasinghe, belonging to the RCL and also university 
academics, emerged in the early 1980s as two dominant literary 
critics who persistently engaged with these avant-garde artists.
The early 1980s witnessed the emergence of young radical 
groups that did not only include artists and critics, but also showed 
a high degree of radical political sensitivity. Members of these groups 
came from diverse sources. Some came from the JVP itself. The 
first such group, Nirmana Sanvada Kulakaya (Circle for Debating 
Art Works), was pioneered by a group linked to the JVP. This was 
formed after the JVP was proscribed in 1983 as a cover-up for its 
underground political activities. However, the organisation soon 
broke up after disagreements emerged over its activities. These 
disagreements highlighted the inability of the established radical 
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politics to accommodate these avant-garde cultural activities. It is 
also notable that the main intellectual inspiration did not come 
from the JVP. Main resource persons, with Sucharitha Gamlath 
being one of them, were highly critical of the JVP in their discussion 
forums.9
At the end of the 1980s, with the backdrop of the JVP-led armed 
insurgency, the avant-garde tendency was also consolidating itself 
as a distinct cultural-political space. The intellectual milieu of the 
first half of the 1990s was very much conducive for the expansion 
of this space. A number of publications and cultural organisations 
were of use for the activities of these young intellectuals. Some of 
these important publications and organisations included Ravaya, 
Yukthiya, and Hiru tabloid newspapers, the Pravada journal 
published by the Social Scientists’ Association, and the Vibhavi 
Cultural Centre. At this juncture, such discourse came under the 
heavy influence of new critical post-modernist intellectual trends 
in the west.
Arguably the culmination of the avant-garde movement 
occurred in the mid 1990s, with the creation of the radical political 
group which came to be known as X Group (X Kandayama). This 
was preceded by a number of small organisational experiments – 
the unknown and marginal history of which is yet to be written. 
The X Kandayama is, however, the most famous and influential 
organisational experiment to have influenced the new generation 
of radical youth. It developed an extremely effective and creative 
way of popularising its ideas, publishing several magazines and 
books, holding public meetings, and contributing to both print and 
electronic media. 
In the 2000s, its impact could be clearly seen among radical 
youth and, most importantly, the JVP was also begun to respond 
to this new phenomenon. The former was seen as significantly 
modifying its cultural and intellectual activities, especially among 
the youth in Colombo’s suburban areas, where the impact of the 
avant-garde left was strongly felt. In the mid 2000s, the JVP had 
seemingly decided to confront the intellectual challenge of this 
avant-garde left in a more proactive manner. In recent times, 
especially, after the decisive 2008 split of the JVP, it seemed to be 
seeking a close association with a certain section of the avant-garde 
left, probably as a part of its recovering process.
Part II. Dynamics of the post-1977 JVP
One of the remarkable characteristics of the JVP’s history is 
its continuous presence as an influential political entity with, of 
course, frequent ups and downs. This could be contrasted with 
the trajectory of the old left, which has become merely a bystander 
on the political scene since 1977. While the old left parties never 
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recovered from the setbacks following the re-establishment of the 
hegemonic and dominant political elite in the 1950s, the JVP has 
showed an immense ability to recover soon after such setbacks. 
One important way to observe the evolution of the JVP is 
by looking at the trajectory of these setbacks and recovery over 
time. I divide the history of the JVP into four periods in terms of 
these recovery, growth, and setback cycles. For the convenience of 
this analysis, a full cycle is started from the point of recovery after 
a period of setback. The cycle completes the setback following a 
peak event which is marked either by state suppression or a major 
internal split. Cycles one and four are given as half cycles because, 
in the first cycle, there is no period of recovery and the fourth cycle 
remains at the recovery phase, and yet to experience the peak. 
Cycle I (half), 1965-1977. The JVP as a separate political 
entity began around 1965 in an embryonic form and as a small 
clandestine group. After that, it experienced a tremendous growth 
until the 1971 armed insurgency, which was crushed by the state. 
This peak event was followed by the period of setbacks in which 
the entire leadership of the organisation was imprisoned. Internal 
disputes and desertions occurred in large scale in the period of the 
setback.
Cycle II (complete), 1977-1994. The JVP’s recovery began 
after the newly elected UNP government released the convicted 
insurgents from prison in 1977. The initial recovery became relatively 
easier in the early years of the UNP regime as the latter used the 
JVP as a sort of cat’s paw to weaken the opposition. This gave the 
JVP an ideal opportunity to revamp its country-wide organisation 
and emerge as the most active radical political movement, especially 
due to the dwindling of the old left parties. At the time of the 1982 
presidential election, it had become a formidable political force by 
surpassing other leftist parties by a large margin. In the election, 
the JVP leader received 273,438 (4.19 per cent) of the total valid 
votes as opposed to 58,531 for Colvin R. de Silva of the LSSP, 
and 17,005 for Vasudeva Nanayakkara of the NSSP. Although the 
further growth of the movement was temporarily hampered by the 
1983 proscription of the party in the aftermath of the anti-Tamil 
pogrom, the ban facilitated its growth as a clandestine movement by 
making it more attractive to potential JVP recruits. The peak was in 
1989 when the JVP was effectively running a parallel government 
with a military power and, to some extent, popular support.10 The 
setback began when the insurgency was crushed in late 1989 and 
early 1990, with almost the entire leadership being executed.
Cycle III (complete), 1994- 2008. With the end of the 17-
year UNP rule by 1994, the JVP again found itself in a favourable 
position to regroup under new leadership. Fading popularity of the 
Chandrika Kumarutunga regime in the late 1990s, the weakness 
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of the UNP to exploit it, and middle-class discontent towards the 
degenerated political elite of both parties, gave the JVP a favourable 
ground on which to establish itself in the electoral mainstream. 
The general election of 2000 clearly showed how well the JVP had 
recovered, when it won 10 seats in the parliament as opposed to 
the one seat it secured at the 1994 election11, and recorded 6 per 
cent out of the total valid votes. It further broadened its voter base 
at the following election in 2001, with 16 seats and 9.10 per cent 
of the vote. There was every sign at this juncture of JVP emerging 
as a serious threat to the existing hegemonic two-party system, 
especially with its growing ability to attract the support of the semi-
urban middle classes. The popular slogan unuth ekai munuth ekai, 
used in the late 1990s and early 2000s, was quite attractive to 
this middle class. The literal meaning of this slogan is ‘both parties 
are alike’. The slogan conveyed voter discontent concerning the 
degeneration of the dominant political elite.
The JVP was, at this time, evidently mulling over the 
possibility of capturing power within the existing electoral system. 
At the 2000 general election, it presented itself before the voting 
public with a manifesto carrying a rather expressive title, Rata 
Hadana Pas Aurudu Selesma (Five-year Plan to Build the Country). 
This manifesto certainly belonged to an era where having a planned 
economy was a popular policy alternative for third-world countries. 
This was definitely not very attractive to the middle classes who 
were quite firmly entrenched in the post-1977 consumerist society. 
Interestingly enough, after the 2000 election this document, 
which was issued in the ceremonious manner, had mysteriously 
disappeared from JVP propaganda. One reason for this could well 
be the self-realisation that this would create a bad reputation for 
the JVP among its middle-class voters.
This period clearly marked a shift in the JVP’s political 
imagining of itself. The formation of the short-lived coalition 
government with the SLFP in 2001 was the highlight of this new 
political imagination. The coalition strategy was followed until 
the 2005 presidential election, which brought to power Mahinda 
Rajapaksha. For a short period, the JVP held three ministerial 
portfolios in the SLFP-led UPFA government of 2004.
The JVP reached the peak in this cycle when it won 39 seats, 
contesting the election under the banner of the UPFA. Unlike the 
peak it reached in 1971 and 1989, this time it was victorious – 
although it was not the final victory it wanted. The JVP, however, 
faced a major dilemma after the election concerning what its next 
step should be. Although it held three ministerial portfolios in the 
2004 government formed by Chandrika Kumarathunga, it soon quit 
them ostensibly over the issue of a proposed post-tsunami interim 
arrangement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). It 
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played a determining role in the victory of Mahinda Rajapaksha in 
the 2005 presidential election, and declined to join the government 
of the latter. This created an internal crisis that ended only with 
the defection of a powerful group led by Wimal Weerawansa in early 
2008.
Cycle IV (incomplete), post 2008. The 2008 defection was 
probably the most serious setback faced by the JVP after the 1989 
suppression. The extent of the setback was evident in the result of 
the provincial council and local government elections held after the 
2008 crisis, in which the performance of the JVP was extremely 
poor. In the middle of this setback, however, the party managed 
to retain its hardcore membership. What was lost was mainly the 
voter base of the semi-urban middle classes. 
The JVP’s recovery effort following the setback seemingly 
focuses on several grounds, including followings: (1) joining forces 
with other opposition elements. An important breakthrough 
in this respect occurred when, in an unprecedented move in 
Sri Lanka’s radical politics, the JVP joined with the UNP, which 
had been considered the last frontier of the ‘regressive camp’; (2) 
strengthening its position in the trade union sector and among 
university students; (3) extending its activities to the Tamil north. 
This was also an important gesture because there had been a 
serious rupture between Tamil politics and the JVP owing to the 
latter’s decisive role in the military crackdown on the LTTE. 
As discussed above, each cycle is consisted a period of growth 
which leads to a peak, and is followed by a period of setback and 
subsequent recovery. After the recovery, a growth occurs again 
which leads once again to a peak. There is, of course, significant 
variation in each cycle, determined by the historical contingencies.
Political vision and ideological orientations of the JVP
The JVP always maintained that it was the only genuine 
Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement in Sri Lanka. The JVP 
version of Marxist-Leninism indeed has very peculiar characteristics. 
Ever since Marxism was introduced to radical politics in Sri Lanka 
in the 1930s, it has occupied a decisive place in the ideological 
baggage of the left. As the intra-group rivalries grew in the left, the 
interpretation of Marxist theory became the focal point, with each 
and every group self-proclaiming itself as the true Marxist party. The 
version of Marxism that has been upheld on the Sri Lankan left is 
the Russian revolutionary Marxism. ‘Marxist-Leninism’ became the 
catch-phrase and the iconic figure of Lenin was treated as the one 
who transformed a doctrine into a set of guiding principles for the 
revolutionary movement. The iconic value of Lenin is an important 
aspect of JVP’s ideological life, with the role of Rohana Wijeweera 
equated to that of Lenin. When Wijeweera was arrested in 1970, he 
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was depicted as the Sri Lankan Lenin in the propaganda campaign 
organised by the young organisation. This perception has remained 
until now, especially in the minds of JVP members (Dewasiri, 
1991). Even when it was functioning within an ultra-nationalist 
politico-ideological context, in which the dominant articulators of 
the ultra-Sinhala nationalist ideology, such as Jathika Chintanaya 
and JHU, viewed Marxism as a threat to the national interests, 
the JVP attempted to interpret its political project in terms of the 
Leninist version of Marxism.
By early the 2000s, the JVP was fully integrated into the Sinhala 
nationalist political project. The most significant organisational 
manifestation of this nationalist orientation was the Patriotic 
National Movement, in which Amarasekera was the main ideologue. 
Wimal Weeravansa had become very close to Amarasekera at that 
time, both ideologically and personally. The latter viewed Marxism 
as a fundamental barrier to carry out true national liberation 
struggle and urged the JVP to abandon its Marxist inclination. It is 
interesting to note even in such a context that Wimal Weeravansa 
was extensively referring to Lenin in justifying his position in the 
intra-party struggle in the late 2000s (Weeravansa, 2008: 181-182, 
186-188, 221, etc.). 
One of the remarkable features of the political behaviour of 
the JVP was its ability to articulate two parallel political agendas 
at the same time – one for the wider masses and another for inside 
the party. It always maintained a safely-guarded political dialogue 
within the party and, also, trained party activists to carry out the 
public agenda to its mass audiences. The internal agenda was 
always quite consistent and the ultimate goal of the party was clearly 
laid out as the establishment of a socialist social order “though 
the dictatorship of proletariat”. Seizing state power was viewed 
as the precondition for achieving this goal. It was upon capturing 
state power  that a secondary agenda for the masses was needed. 
This public agenda was devised in accordance with the party’s 
strategic aim of state power. In the strategic thinking of the post-
1977 period, mass support was viewed as a key to the capturing of 
political power, either through armed struggle or popular elections. 
Therefore, a secondary agenda was always in place to win popular 
support in the Sinhala-Buddhist south.
The party leadership had a clear idea as to the ideological clash 
between the inner party agenda and the public agenda. For example, 
the party leadership was conscious that it could not integrate 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism into the official party ideology even 
though it used the former on tactical grounds. In executing this 
extremely subtle dual strategy, a sharp differentiation had to be 
maintained between the party activist and the masses. The notion 
upakrama (tactics) was crucial in the JVP political language in 
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explaining this dual strategy to party activists. Whenever a party 
cadre showed any uncertainty over the dual strategy, the well-
known answer was “eka upakramayak sahodaraya” (comrade, it is 
only a tactic). Wimal Weeravansa eloquently articulated this dual 
strategy in his internal struggle to persuade the party to support 
the presidential candidacy of Mahinda Rajapaksha at the 2005 
presidential election. He argued that the party had to show this 
support this time as a tactical move with the intention of contesting 
and winning the 2010 presidential election (Weeravansa, 2008: 
111).
JVP’s ideological behaviour has acquired a unique character, 
owing mainly to this dual-strategy approach. This ideological 
behaviour is characterised by the articulation of elements of several 
ideological discourses within one political agenda. These ideological 
elements, forming the ideological baggage of the JVP, play their role 
in JVP’s ideological behaviour in different conjunctures depending 
on the tactic it has used to gain public support for its political 
agenda. There are certain moments of discontinuities in the JVP’s 
history in which different ideological components contribute to 
shaping its political agenda and internal splits occur as a result of 
tension between each ideological component. 
Looking at the ideological baggage of the JVP, the following 
components can be identified as its major parts: left radicalism; 
soft Sinhala nationalism; rural-oriented radical populism. 
These ideological elements were effective in appealing to the JVP 
constituency, which was characterised by youth of rural origin 
who held urban-oriented social dreams. The outward projection 
of the JVP’s political programme was always formulated by way 
of articulating these ideological elements to suit the specific 
conjuncture. 
The general pattern of the politico-ideological discontinuities 
of the JVP is that at a certain point of the progression of the 
politico-ideological project, the dominant ideological element is 
reached to such a conflicting point with the political goal of the core 
organisation. This conflict can be explained in terms of the dual-
strategy approach, where two separate agendas are articulated 
subtly by the leadership in order to find a wider recognition and 
mass support for the inner agenda. Owing to the high level of 
ideological power of the outward agenda, the political subjectivity 
of the activist is transformed and restructured by the tactically 
employed ideological agenda. At a certain point, intra-party rivalries 
organise the outward agenda in opposition to the internal agenda. 
Members politicised through the political rituals of the outward 
agenda remain, at the same time, unquestionably loyal to the 
leadership and swinging between two agendas. At the time of the 
rupture, the membership is divided between two groups depending 
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on the power equilibrium of intra-party rival groups and the relative 
strength of the articulatory capability in regards to the outward 
ideological component.
This can best be illustrated by the trajectories of political life 
of two important figures who played decisive roles in the recovery 
period following the 1989 debacle, namely Rohitha Bhashana 
Abewardana and Wimal Weeravansa. These two young activists 
who survived the state repression of 1989 worked closely to re-
organise the party. Abewardana’s political subjectivity was 
transformed and restructured through his engagements with Tamil 
militant politics when there was a short-lived opening toward the 
Tamil militant movement after 1989. As Abewardana became a 
key figure in this engagement, he became a strong defender of the 
Tamils’ right to self-determination. He soon left the JVP to form 
an alternative political group. Later, he became a passionate critic 
of the JVP’s stance on the Tamil-nationalist political demands. 
Weeravansa’s political subjectivity was transformed and structured 
in the opposite direction. When ultra-Sinhala nationalism became 
the key component of the outward agenda of the dual strategy in 
the late 1990s, at a time when Weeravansa became the principle 
spokesperson, his political subjectivity was transformed and 
structured through the engagement in the Sinhala ultra-nationalist 
political project. When he left the JVP in 2008, he had become the 
most popular exponent of the Sinhala ultra-nationalist discourse.
This dual-strategy approach where diverse politico-ideological 
elements, were articulated in order to achieve an internally defined 
political goal, made the JVP a unique and extremely vibrant political 
entity. This helped the JVP, at least partially, to recover from serious 
defeats and remain as a political player with significant mass 
support. However, at the same time, this unique characteristic 
of articulating diverse – and sometimes potentially conflicting – 
ideological components into one political agenda created frequent 
internal splits. 
Part III. The dilemma of mainstreaming radical politics: By way 
of conclusion
When the JVP achieved a high level of mass support and 
became firmly established as an integral part of the political 
mainstream of the Sinhala-Buddhist south during 2004-2005, its 
radical spirit had sharply declined. I propose the following three 
factors that caused this de-radicalisation and mainstreaming: (1) 
elitisation of the JVP leadership; (2) transformation of the political 
subjectivity of the rural youth; (3) broadening of the social base of 
the JVP. 
Elitisation of the JVP leadership. Unlike the leadership of 
the old left, the JVP leadership came from a non-elite background 
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– the leadership itself was very much part of the JVP constituency. 
Nevertheless, in the post-1989 re-organisation process, an important 
transformation took place in the leadership ranks. Having been in 
the political mainstream for a long time, the top leadership was 
transforming itself into elite status. I identify three factors of this 
elitisation. 
The first is the election of a fairly large number of members 
into representative bodies. The electoral process in Sri Lanka in 
the past few decades has become a mechanism for upward social 
mobility. Those who are elected to representative bodies have 
attempted to make use of these elected offices to enhance their 
wealth, power, and social status. The experience of the JVP in the 
past 15 years has been, however, somewhat different. JVP-elected 
members for representative bodies have been closely supervised by 
the party mechanism. Nonetheless, it has been unavoidable that 
the social status of these elected members has enhanced once they 
have been elected and once engaged in their public work. Coming 
from lower strata of the status hierarchy of the social setting, they 
have been automatically promoted to higher stratum once elected, 
with the obtainment of elite status.
The second is the consolidation of the JVP trade union sector 
and emergence of a union bureaucracy in the JVP trade union 
leadership. The vibrant trade union sector in Sri Lanka has, for 
a long time, facilitated the establishment of a union bureaucracy 
which has functioned as an intermediary between unionised 
wage labourers, employers, and the state in collective bargaining 
processes. In the past 15 years, the JVP has firmly established 
itself in the trade union sector. One of the natural results of this 
development has been the elevation of the union leadership to 
the elite level. Attending international conferences and becoming 
important media figures have become significant features of this 
elite status. 
The third is the growth of the party bureaucracy and full-
timers. With the expansion of party activity, the party bureaucracy 
has grown, along with its full-timers. The financial strength of the 
party has vastly improved in the past two decades. Therefore, the 
lives of party officials and full-timers have certainly improved. This 
situation has certainly elevated them above the level of ordinary 
party members. 
It should be mentioned that the JVP leadership has been 
quite aware of the possible aftermath of such an elitisation of the 
leadership. Equal status of party members is considered as a basic 
norm. Therefore, party members elected to representative bodies 
have been subjected to a strict code of conduct. The most important 
one of these codes is the policy of remunerating party members who 
are representatives of elected bodies. They are not allowed to use 
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the salaries attached to these position. These salaries are sent to a 
common fund which is used for social welfare projects. There are 
some restrictions over the use of vehicles, too. I argue, however, 
that these measures have not been entirely successful in order of 
obstructing the elitisation process, although they certainly have 
discouraged it.
Moreover, this elitisation was a logical outcome of integration 
of the JVP into the hegemonic political mainstream. In frequenting 
associations of hegemonic forces, such as the cooperated sector, 
state bureaucracy, and foreign diplomatic circles, the party 
leadership has been forced to maintain a certain level of high social 
status. While the status that the JVP leadership has maintained is 
significantly lower compared to the situation with the other main 
parties, there have been some extreme cases as well. The case of 
Wimal Weeravansa may be cited as one such extreme case. He has 
been targeted by the media for maintaining a lavish lifestyle. Also, 
he has frequently been caricatured by cartoonists with two mobile 
phones to signify this lavish lifestyle. 
Transformation of the political subjectivity of rural 
youth. In the past two decades, the Sri Lankan economy has 
undergone fundamental change, with a significant drop in the 
unemployment rate being one important aspect. Various new 
outlets for rural surplus labour have opened up. The expansion of 
the rural and urban economic activities, along with new openings 
for the international labour market, has been one such important 
outlet. This situation has certainly widened the scope for rural 
youth to explore their expectations. 
These changes have certainly transformed the political 
subjectivity of the rural youth. If the JVP’s political appeal matched 
with the despairing mindset of the unemployed and underemployed 
rural youth in the 1960s and 1980s, the situation in the past decade 
or so has become quite different. New forms of hegemony are now 
in action in order to integrate the rural youth to the dominant 
social and cultural setting. Consumerisation of society has reached 
a point where the remotest areas of the country are not immune 
from the new consumer culture. This culture has captured the 
minds of the rural youth with immense power, and also caused 
major de-politicisation among them. The proliferation of electronic 
media (television and FM radio channels) and the availability of 
cheaper consumer goods have captured the minds of rural youth. 
The enormous attraction of a new ‘reality TV’ phenomenon among 
the rural youth has a clear manifestation in the hegemonic power 
of the new consumer culture. 
Broadening of the social base of the JVP. As already 
indicated, the JVP has become a formidable electoral force among 
the semi-urban middle classes in the past 15 years. The political 
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subjectivity of this social class has fundamentally differed from 
that of the rural youth who the JVP has mobilised for two armed 
insurgencies. This new social base of the JVP, combined with the 
de-radicalisation of the rural youth, has facilitated the party’s 
transformation from a radical anti-systemic political movement to 
a reformist political party. The de-radicalisation of the JVP social 
base becomes self-evident if one looks at the ease with which it 
has been able to move from the radical political path to a more 
conformist one. It is with remarkable ease that the JVP has opted to 
form a coalition with the SLFP – a strategy that the JVP vehemently 
opposed from its very beginning. One may recall here the stiff 
resistance that old left parties faced when they started on the same 
path. In the case of the JVP, however, the passage of crossing from 
revolutionary idealism to mainstream coalition politics has come 
much more easily.
Prospects for the post-2008 JVP
The split of the JVP in 2008 was certainly a turning point. The 
immediate aftermath of the split was self-evident from the result of 
the elections that followed. The JVP suffered heavy losses compared 
with the major electoral gains that it had achieved since the late 
1994. What would be the implications of these losses in elections? 
Certain quarters seemed to think that the JVP would turn back to 
the arms struggle. The government’s propaganda machine seemed 
to be thinking along similar lines, either genuinely or as a pretext 
for cracking down on JVP anti-government activities. 
Whether or not the JVP is toying with the idea of shifting 
towards an arms struggle, there are definite structural impediments 
for following such an approach. The main factor is the transformation 
in the political subjectivity of the rural youth whose support is 
indispensable for an arms struggle. Anti-systemic political strategy 
now is certainly less attractive to the rural youth compared to the 
situation in the pre-1990 period. At any rate, it is evident that 
the JVP is facing a serious problem of raison d’être. The JVP is 
certainly well aware of this crisis. It seems that it is experimenting 
on two alternative political paths. One is to focus more on popular 
oppositional politics, with ‘democracy’ as the broader slogan and 
a focus on addressing issues that are of immediate interest to 
the general public. The mainstay of this line is to mobilise people 
around jailed former military chief Sarath Fonseka.
At the same time there is a growing emphasis on a more orthodox 
Marxist-Leninist political line. This political line is seemingly more 
popular among younger elements in the party. Recently, a younger 
group of the party started a periodical appropriately named Aurora 
(vol.1 no. 1, December 2010-January 2011). Aurora was the name 
of the legendary Russian Ship associated with the Bolshevik victory 
in the Russian revolution of 1917. 
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At first sight, however, these two lines may not seem as 
representing two different orientations but, instead, be seen as 
mutually complementary. It can be easily explained in terms of 
the dual-strategy approach that elaborated earlier. However, it is 
too early to judge whether these two lines are a manifestation of a 
strategically defined two-pronged political line, or a manifestation 
of desperate attempts to recover from the recent setbacks.
The absence of reliable internal information of discussions 
from the party precludes us from making strong conclusions 
about these two lines. However, critically evaluating publicly 
available material, I propose that these two political orientations 
represent a uniquely novel development in the JVP – namely, the 
emergence of a diversity of party political lines out of the distinct 
political subjectivity of two constituencies being catered to by the 
party. The ‘democracy’ line is catering to the semi-urban middle 
class which certainly is a very well-established social class in the 
existing hegemony of capitalist consumerism. The ‘socialist’ line is 
catering to radical youth who have not yet been fully hegemonised 
in the ‘system’. However, it is highly unlikely that this section of 
youth, which is certainly less despairing in comparison to the 
rebelliousness of earlier generations that took part in 1971 and 
1987-89 insurgencies, will turn to armed struggle.
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Endnotes 
1 For the macro-economic changes in 1977, see Luxman (1997).
2 For 1980 general strike see Fernando (1983).
3 The political economy of the JVP constituency has been discussed sufficiently. 
Immediately after the 1971 insurgency, a number of scholars attempted to 
understand what had happened. This produced ample amount of literature on it 
in which significant attention had been given to the socio-economic roots of the 
insurgency. Halliday (1971), Keerawella (1980), and Obeyesekera (1974) provided 
useful information regarding the social base of the early phase of the JVP. 
Furthermore, the ‘Circle of Pauperisation’, proposed by Shanmugaratnam (1984: 
26), lucidly illustrated the crisis of peasant production in the Sinhala-Buddhist 
south, leading to the radicalisation of the rural youth.
4 For a useful account of the despair among the rural youth which generated radical 
anti-systemic anger, see Uyangoda (2003).
5 For a useful explanation on the impact of post-1977 macro-economic policies on 
youth unrest, see Luxman (1996: 89-102).
6 I use the term ‘normalisation’ following Thomas Kuhn’s characterisation of ‘normal 
science’ which follows the ‘paradigm shift’ (Khun, 1962).
7 Shanthasiri (2004) has studied this diminishing radicalness by using Robert 
Tucker’s thesis of ‘deradicalisation of Marxist movements’ (Tucker, 1967).
8 Prof. Sumanasiri Liyanage, polity-bureau member of the NSSP at that time, 
described to me the optimism of the NSSP leadership concerning the events of June-
August 1980. He also told me that Nalin de Silva was so disillusioned by the defeat 
of the strike.
9 I thank Nandana Weerarathna, a founding member of this group, for providing me 
with this information.
10 For this period of JVP activities, see Chandraprema (1991), Gunarathna (1990), 
Gunasekera (1998).
11 At the 1994 election, it did not contest as the JVP, but under the banner of its 
proxy Sri Lanka Progressive Front.
Mainstreaming Radical Politics in Sri Lanka
92
References
Alles, A.C. (2001) Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (1969-1989), 
Rathmalana: Vishvalekha.
Alokabandara, Sumana (2001) Sinhala Vedikave raththaran Avadiya 
Pilibanda Sumana Mataka (Memories of Sumana on the 
golden era of the Sinhala theatre), Dehiwala: Vidarshana.
Amarasekera, Gunadasa (1962) Yali Upannemi, Gampaha, Sri 
Lanka: Sarasavi Publishers.
Amarasekera, Gunadasa (1976 &1996) Abuddassa Yugayak, 
Borelesgamuwa, Sri Lanka: Visidunu Publication.
Amarasekera, Gunadasa (1987) Ganaduru Mediyama Dakinemi 
Arunalu, Maharagama, Sri Lanka: Chintana Parshadaya.
Amarasekera, Gunadasa (1993) Jathika Chinthanayai Jathika 
Arthikayai, Maharagama, Sri Lanka: Chintana Parshadaya.
Amarasekera, Gunadasa (2009), Gamanaka Meda, Borelesgamuwa, 
Sri Lanka: Visidunu Publication.
Amarasinghe, Y.R. (2000), Revolutionary Idealism and Parliamentary 
Politics: A Study of Trotskyism in Sri Lanka, Social Scientists’ 
Association Aurora, Vol. 1, No. 1. (in Sinhala). 
Chandraprema C.A. (1981) Sri Lanka, the Years of Terror: The J.V.P. 
Insurrection,  1987-1989, Colombo: Lake House Bookshop.
De Silva, Nalin (1986) Mage Lokaya, Author Publication.
Dewasiri, Nirmal Ranjith (1991) Deshapalana Nayakayeku Lesa 
Rohana Wijeweerage Balapema- 1966-1989 (Impact of 
Rohana Wijeweera as a political leader) (Unpublished 
dissertation submitted for the BA degree in History, 
University of Colombo). 
Dewasiri, Nirmal Ranjith (2000) Formation of Sinhala Nationalist 
Ideology in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries 
(Unpublished dissertation submitted for the MPhil degree in 
History, University of Colombo) 
Dissanayake, Wimal (2005) Enabling Traditions: Four Sinhala 
Cultural Intellectuals, Borelesgamuwa, Sri Lanka: Visidunu 
Publication.
Fernando, Laksiri (1983), ‘The State and Class Strugglein Sri Lanka: 
The General Strike of 1980’ Labour Capital and Society, 
McGill University, November 1983
Gunaratna, Rohan (1990) Sri Lanka, a lost revolution? The inside 
story of the JVP Institute of Fundamental Studies, Kandy, 
Sri Lanka
Gunasekera, Prins (1998) A Lost Generation: Sri Lanka in Crisis, 
Colombo: S. Godage&Brothers.
Gunasinghe, Siri (1960) Hevenella, Colombo: Rathna Publishers.
Fred Halliday (1971) ‘The Ceylonese Insurrection’, New Left Review 
I/69, September-October 1971. 
93
PCD Journal Vol. II, No. 1 2010
Keerawella, G.B. (1980) ‘The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna and the 
1971 Uprising’, Social Science Review, No. 2 Jan. 1980.
Kuhn, Thomas, S. (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Laxman, W. D. (1996) ‘Macro-Economic Policy Framework and its 
implications for Youth Unrest’, in Unrest or Revolt: Some 
aspects of youth unrest in Sri Lanka (ed. By S.T. Hettige), 
Colombo: Goethe-Institute.
Laxman, W.D. (1997), Dilemmas of Development, Colombo: Sri 
Lanka Association of Economists.
Moore, Mick (1993) ‘Thoroughly Modern Revolutionaries: The JVP 
in Sri Lanka’, in Modern Asian Studies, 27, 3, pp. 593-642.
JVP (2000) Rata Hadana Pasaurudu Selesma (Five Year Plan to 
Build the Country), JVP Publication 2000. 
Shanmugaratnam, N. (1984) ‘Sri Lanka’s “New” Economic Policy 
and Agriculture’  Social Scientist, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Mar., 1984).
Shanthasiri, Abewarna Patabendige (2004) Viplaveeya 
Drushtivadaya Ha Parlimentuwadee Deshapalanaya; 
Janatha Wimukthi Peramuna Pilibanda Adyayanayak, 
(Revolutionary Ideology and Parliamentary Politics; A 
Study on the JVP), Unpublished MPhil Thesis, Peradeiya 
University.
Tennakoon, Serena (1988) ‘Rituals of Development: The Accelerated 
Mahaveli Development Program of Sri Lanka’ in American 
Ethnologist Vol.15.
Tucker, Robert (1967) ‘The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements’, 
The American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Jun., 
1967).
Uyangoda, J. (2003) ‘Social Conflict, Radical Resistance and 
Projects of State Power in Southern Sri Lanka: The Case of 
JVP’ in Markus Mayer, et.al., (eds.) Building Local Capacities 
for Peace: Rethinking Conflict and Development in Sri Lanka. 
London: Macmillan. 
Weeravansa, Wimal (2008) Ntta venuvata etta: ja.vi.pe. arbudaye 
sebe hetu (Truth instead of Lies: real causes of the JVP 
crisis), Battaramulla, Sri Lanka: Nidahase Niyamuwo.
 
Appendix 
Illustration I
